Is Hegel a liberal?

Individualism, in the classical sense is a political belief that the state should not intervene and interfere with the individual. Individual liberty is paramount to the political ideal of liberalism, as it stresses on the importance of individual rights. In particular, classical liberalism is associated with the belief that states should only institute negative freedom through coercion. In Elements of the Philosophy of Right, Hegel demonstrates through the dialectic argument how the idea of the state is arrived. The dialectic approach stresses on reiterating each moment of the dialectic process, which in turn leads to the gradual concrete realization of the will, beginning from a sole existence in-itself and ending with the concluding existence for-itself. While Hegelian philosophy may not be traditionally regarded as liberal, it reinforces notions of freedom, liberty, and most importantly, individual rights with meticulous clarification. While his philosophy does not appear to be explicit, Hegel demonstrates how it leads to a liberal state. The individual comes to a conclusion of to an existence for-itself, which is reinforced by particularized will.
Hegelian philosophy, while not conventionally regarded as liberal, however, exemplifies Hegel’s idea of making implicit concepts explicit. He also believes that his philosophical method is non-refutable, as he clearly states in the beginning of Elements of the Philosophy of Right: “The author will regard any criticism expressed in a form other than that of scientific discussion of the matter itself merely as a subjective postscript and random assertion, and will treat it with indifference.” Hegel later demonstrates that Hegelian philosophy actually incorporates aspects of individualism with the concrete existence of the individual in the state. These aspects, in fact, are actualized in civil society. The subject matter of discussing rights and the right to property (as it relates to the freedom of individuals in societies) can only be regarded as an abstract idea. Thus, his philosophy is justified by virtue of grasping ideas from its initial reduced, nebulous, and objective root. Any conceivable notion of individual freedom and property rights according to Hegel has its origin in an abstract form, and is dealt with in a similarly abstract manner: “Philosophy has to do with Ideas and therefore not with what are commonly described as mere concepts.”
Where Hegel does not explicitly articulate liberal views is his claim that without ever fully realizing abstract rights, the meaning of individualism is equally abstract, and therefore, not put into practice. In the abstract form, the individual has free albeit un-actualized free will. Hegel believes that the individual is free to will anything in the most abstract form. Inherently, this statement does not contribute much further to the progress of thought and is insufficient alone, yet it establishes an important basis for further inquiry, thus reaffirming the will in a positive tone. The succeeding moments testify whether this will actualized. For this reason, Hegel believes that anything in the liberal sense is unrestricted until it is reconstructed in the real world. Conflicts may arise between the ideal (what is conceptualized) and reality (that which is actualized) in the latter moments. The notion prior to conceptualized individual rights is not, as Hegel clarifies, the notion of a defined and specific right but the notion that one has the luxury to will anything. The succeeding stages of the dialectic argument strengthen this notion substantially, by giving the pure abstract concept subjectivity. In light of this reasoning, Hegel concludes that all actualization of the will is confirmed through particularization. In particular, the actualized will is the free will defined by what it is refrained from doing: “With reference to concrete action and to moral and ethical relations, abstract right is only a possibility, and the determination of right is therefore only a permission or warrant.”
Hegel’s dialectic argument emphasizes more on the specific details of willing than on the notion of whether individualism should be preserved in the state. He believes that it is not right to demand that individuals conform to abstract universal ideals on notions of individual rights because it does not correspond to their particular specific interests. Moreover, every actual stage of his argument confines the definition of individual liberty reached thus far in the moment; they are constraint by dialectical parameters. Every actualization of a concept is a representation, and “every representation is a generalization, and this is inherent in thought. To generalize something means to think it.” Hence, it is possible to generalize about free will independently of any associations with the state or society, but the representation of individual will in the state does not necessarily correspond to what has been generalized. To clarify, the representation does not translate itself as completely identical to what was hypothesized in the preceding moment. On the other hand, Hegel is careful to point out that crucial elements from previous stages are preserved in the next moment. Some elements of individualism are conserved. Every next stage is an improvement from the existing stage by representing the idea in a less and less abstract form and conversely, more and more substantial form.
Thus, Hegel’s philosophy, despite being readily regarded as anti-liberal, however, meticulously clarifies the critical difference between what one has unlimited liberty to think abstractly, and what one is able to practice. This is an important distinction between free will and individual right: “The distinction between thought and will is simply that between theoretical and practical attitudes. But they are not two separate faculties; on the contrary, the will is a particular way of thinking – thinking translating itself into existence.” Hegel also makes the further distinction between the realm of rational thought and will: “Those who believe that the human being is infinite in the realm of the will in general, but that he – or reason itself – is limited in the realm of thought, have little understanding of the nature of thinking and willing.” As such, Hegelian philosophy deals with arriving at a solid conclusion. His premise acknowledges that we must begin with the individual having specific wants, needs and desires.
Hegel does not expressively shows how he is liberal when he advocates for the state to retain and exercise its role over the individual. On claims made by other political philosophers that the state precedes or dominates the individual, Hegel regards this view as too authoritarian and not a possible conclusion according to the dialectic argument. The view that individualism is superseded by the state is false. Hegel corrects this belief by claiming that individualism has merely “transferred the determinations of private property to a sphere of a totally different and higher nature.” He shows how the anti-liberal view that each individual has consented and conferred their powers to the sovereign is unsupported and merely “superficial thinking, which envisages only a single unity of different wills.” Thus, by his philosophical clarification, “the distinction between thought and will is simply that between theoretical and practical attitudes.”
It is easy to misunderstood Hegel as anti-liberal in the traditional sense based on his concepts of the abstract will. For Hegel, the will, and not individualism is an abstract notion. Also, by Hegelian philosophy, an abstract idea of force or coercion (an abstract notion that contradicts individual right) is an expression against the will. By the same logic, Hegel argues that anything which contradicts the existence of an idea therefore contradicts its liberty: “Abstract right is a coercive right, because a wrong committed against a force directed against the existence of my freedom is an external thing.”
Hegel shows how while his political philosophy appears anti-liberal it contains elements of liberalism through its argument for personhood. Rationality endows the individual with a concrete existence. The actualization of the will leads to particular wills, that is, a definite specific will for external objects, which in turn creates further synthetic or particular needs. Personhood is defined at this particular moment precisely when the individual acquires a definite personality, and whose rational thoughts become subjective thoughts. In the previous stage, that abstract notion of willing something is so vague that it is [paradoxically] an objective notion. Everything that a person wills is a generalization, and “to generalize means to think it.” Therefore, in the state that Hegel arrives at, and which is, according to his understanding, actualized through individual rationale, is the materialization of what is good. While it may appear by his statements such as “The commandment of right is therefore: be a person and respect others as persons,” seems to oppose the absolute sense of liberalism, it preserves the idea that the will becomes particularized and, more importantly, recognizes those willed by others. As he clearly explains, every person is “the infinite will.”
Hegel also believes that some elements of individualism are most fully realized in the community. Without an existence that respects the right of the state, individuals are mere disparate entities whose wills corresponds only with “abstract universals” , and therefore not a will at all. The state gives the individual concrete existence, and defines the individual’s personality. Likewise, within the community, “The personality alone confers a right to things, and consequently that personal right is in essence a right of things.” All particular stages arrived by Hegelian dialectic argument is that which is good. While Hegel philosophizes from the individual, he concludes that the individual needs to respect the state that has created for it a system of particularized needs. According to his argument that the subjective will (realized in the state) constitutes its substance, (analogously to the relationship of gravity to body), it follows that particularized will is an inherent property of the state.
Hence the community, according to Hegel, is composed of mediated will through self-consciousness, and the concrete realization of the will. Based on his rigorous clarification, individualism, as well as liberalism, is not simply about promoting self-interest and restricting state intervention on the individual’s behalf, but a clear distinction that the will is mediated through interaction with other wills. Simply having an idea of what one wants or wishes to will is the first half of the dialectic, with the latter half testifying whether such an abstract will is rational. The system of ethics and laws are derived from the result of how individual will is actualized. Thus, regarding whether Hegel is liberal, it is important to consider the extent of rational freedom that the individual is allowed to have in society. Hegel does not concern himself with the absolute liberty of willing whatever the individual fancies. In fact, he clarifies that the individual realizes, in attempting to materialize the will, that its action may affect others.
The critical difference between traditional liberals and Hegel is that Hegel recognizes the potential consequences of one’s deed, or the “intention.” His philosophy stresses and focuses more on the individual’s self-consciousness, and demonstrates how the concept of individual right is a manifestation of the self-conscious will: “The state is the actuality of concrete freedom. But concrete freedom requires that personal individuality […] Individuals do not live as private persons merely for these particular interests without at the same time directing their will to a universal end and acting in conscious awareness of this end.” By simultaneously recognizing the universal, the individual arrives at an existence for-itself. Individualism according to Hegel respects conscious self-awareness, reflected in the practice of individualism by others. All particularized will or desire – right to property, possession of objects is subjective means to the real objective idea of the will. For this reason, he is not a liberal in the classical sense, as Hegel believes that self-consciousness individualistic motives must be guided by social responsibility.